Table of Contents
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................... 3
Executive summary .................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 6
1. Background and causes of the crisis ...................................................................................... 8
2. Evolution of human security: 2000-2005............................................................................. 12
3. The role of the international community and of the United Nations ................................... 17
4. UNDP’s contribution to improved human security.............................................................. 21
5. Partnerships, coordination and management........................................................................ 30
6. Conclusions and lessons learned.......................................................................................... 34
Annex I: List of People Consulted ........................................................................................... 37
Annex II: Bibliography ............................................................................................................ 39
Acronyms
CEP Provisional Electoral Council
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration ICF Interim Cooperation Framework
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
NGO non-governmental organization
OAS Organization of American States
PIR Integrated Emergency Response Programme Targeting Vulnerable
Groups and Communities in Haiti
PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
SRSG Special Representative of the Secretary-General
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
Executive summary
The situation in Haiti is not a post-conflict situation but rather a protracted and violent 20-year
long transition following the end of the predatory dictatorship of the Duvaliers. The crisis left
Haiti as the poorest State in the western hemisphere with 56 percent of the population living
under conditions of extreme poverty (less than US $1 a day). The crisis is as much the result
of a prevailing culture of violence, widespread corruption and the criminalization of armed
groups as it is of neglect by the international community.
It was only in 2004, after six United Nations missions that were generally considered
to be failures, that the United Nations and the international community recognized that a longterm commitment and a robust multi-dimensional Security Council mandate were required for
the new United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH).
The new United Nations Mission was also established in line with the concept of
‘integrated missions’ and the Resident Representative of the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) was appointed as Deputy Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral, cumulating the functions of Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator.
During 2000-2005, UNDP had to adapt its role to the evolution of the internal situation and
the nature of the United Nations presence in the country.
The years 2000-2005 were marked by two distinct periods. During the first phase,
which began with the controversial second election of Jean-Bertrand Aristide in November
2000 the lasted till the departure of President Aristide in February 2004, UNDP operated in
the absence of a Security Council or General Assembly mandated mission. UNDP’s major
contribution during that period was the launching of a multi-year programme titled
Programme integer de reponse (PIR) that contributed significantly to allowing a resumption
of humanitarian and recovery assistance in a situation where most donors rejected direct
cooperation with Government authorities. Following the withdrawal of MICAH (Mission
internationale civile d’appui en Haiti1
) in February 2001, the Resident Coordinator became
the senior-most United Nations official in the country and, as a result, played a very
prominent role in the days and weeks immediately following the exile of President Aristide.
With the establishment of MINUSTAH in 2004, UNDP’s role had to adapt to its new
responsibilities in support of the Security Council mandate. Through its participation in
MINUSTAH, UNDP is an integral part of the renewed international effort to support
transition in Haiti and improve the situation of Haitians. While support to the justice sector
and other programmes started before 2004, new activities undertaken by UNDP during the
transition period have included support to the electoral process and to the Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) programmes. The role of UNDP in the electoral
process represented a major increase in the financial resources administered by the UNDP
country office and put a heavy toll on limited human resources. This role, however, remained
very administrative and technical, increasing an often expressed perception that UNDP was
moving away from its core development mandate into a service-providing function. Despite
the slow progress in the DDR programme, some interesting innovations were introduced in
1
International Civilian Support Mission, Haiti
Haiti that could serve as models elsewhere. On the management side, the major innovation
was the creation of a totally integrated management structure between UNDP and
MINUSTAH; another major advance was the decision of the Security Council to allocate
limited resources from assessed contributions for reintegration activities of the DDR
programme.
Major lessons derived from this case study in Haiti include:
• The international community shares some of the responsibility for the crisis in Haiti in
the absence of a proactive prevention strategy and a sustained long-term commitment.
• The concept of integrated missions is being promoted through the formal adoption of
‘integrated areas of activity’ (DDR, justice, electoral support, national dialogue and
protection of the children). The formula could help promote a more coherent
cooperation between the United Nations mission and members of the United Nations
Country Team.
• UNDP’s role in support of the electoral process has been effective but limited only to
providing administrative and technical support. This has raised questions about the
justification of UNDP’s participation in terms of the organization’s core mandate.
• Important management and funding innovations introduced in the DDR programmes
could serve as models for other, similar situations.
• UNDP has shown leadership through its capacity to adapt, anticipate and innovate.
• UNDP’s capacity to create Trust Funds and manage them with flexibility is viewed as
a major asset by both the United Nations Secretariat and donor partners. On the other
hand, UNDP’s image suffers because of its slow procedures for disbursing funds to
implementing partners, contractors and staff.
• UNDP’s outreach beyond Port-au-Prince is rather limited. Opportunities have
probably been lost to capitalize on a security situation reported as more favourable in
the countryside and urban centres outside the capital city.
• Relations with the civil society have been intense but are often based on personal
contacts rather than on structured institutional arrangements.
Introduction
Haiti is one of six countries selected by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
as case studies supporting an external evaluation, conducted between 2000 and 2005, of the
organization’s role and contribution in countries affected by conflicts. The evaluation intends
to investigate to what extent UNDP’s activities in conflict-afflicted countries contributed to
the goal of human security defined broadly as ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’.
Whereas the consolidated evaluation report formulates recommendations aimed at improving
UNDP’s global performance in addressing the needs of conflict-affected countries, each of the
case studies identifies lessons learned based on concrete experience in a particular
environment.
The case study in Haiti involved extensive desk work as well as a field visit that took
place between 11 and 19 January 2006. The case study was conducted by Carrol Faubert from
Abacus International Management (one of the three international consultants responsible for
the overall evaluation) and Michèle Oriol, an independent national consultant. The team held
extensive discussions with the senior management of the UNDP country office, with
programme and project staff, as well as with UNDP’s major partners in the Government of
Transition, leading donors, and some of the United Nations officials in Haiti. A particular
effort was made to meet members of the civil society so as to obtain views and analysis from
people not directly involved as partners to UNDP. A list of persons met by the evaluation
team appears as Annex II. In preparation for the field mission, the team examined several
documents that were either assembled by the Evaluation Office and the UNDP country office,
or identified through the consultants’ own research. Key documents consulted by the
evaluation team appear as Annex III.
Unfortunately, the only visit planned to the outskirts of Port-au-Prince to look at a
project had to be cancelled due to the security considerations. This absence of direct exposure
to the situation outside the capital could only be partially compensated for through discussions
with international non-governmental organizations operating in the provinces and through the
extensive personal experience of the national consultant.
The paucity of reliable data collected in a systematic way over several years make it
difficult to identify usable indicators of human security over the time frame of 2000-2005
given to the evaluation exercise. This has meant, for example, that most of the data related to
personal safety was recent and that any comparisons with the past had to rely on the
perception of respondents. Annex I provides a compilation of selected statistics on human
security in Haiti.
The present report reviews the background to the current crisis and assesses the
evolution of human security in Haiti over recent years, using the broad parameters of personal
safety, human rights, rule of law as well as economic environment and livelihoods. It
discusses the role of the international community, especially UNDP, in trying to improve the
situation in Haiti and reviews UNDP’s main partnerships, including its participation in the
integrated United Nations mission2
. The report also examines issues related to the
2
Although UNDP cooperated closely with the successive missions mandated by the Security Council or General
Assembly between 1993 and February 2002, MINUSTAH (Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation en
Haïti), established in June 2004, was the first mission where the UNDP Resident Representative was designated
as Deputy Representative of the Secretary-General.
management of UNDP operations in a crisis situation, and a final section draws some
conclusions and lessons.
1. Background and causes of the crisis
After numerous delays and setbacks, Haiti’s Presidential elections were finally held on 7
February 2006. However, as results indicating that Presidential candidate René Préval was
just short of a victory in the first round started being announced, his supporters took to the
streets amid rumours of fraud. On 16 February 2006, after a week of demonstrations arising
from the rumours and confusion regarding the vote counting operation, the Provisional
Electoral Council (CEP3
) announced that René Préval had won the Presidential election on the
first round of voting with 51.2 percent of the vote. In what one of the 33 candidates termed as
“an electoral coup”, the CEP decided to adopt an internationally-backed formula and
distributed blank votes proportionally between candidates, as a result of which René Préval’s
score jumped from 48.8 percent to 51.2 percent. A second round was thus avoided and the
week-long violence on the streets calmed down. An important question is whether stability
will now prevail in Haiti. One indication of improved conditions is that the number of
kidnappings, a phenomenon that had been on the rise before the elections, dropped
significantly from 106 in December 2005 to only 18 in February 2006. There is hope, but it
remains very fragile.
Since the departure of Jean-Claude Duvalier in February 1986, Haiti has been engaged
in a seemingly endless political transition punctuated by several military coups, outbursts of
violence and foreign military interventions. The case of Haiti cannot be described as a conflict
situation. There has been no recent situation of war with a neighbouring country, nor has there
been a civil war between opposing Haitian factions or communities. Haiti is a case of a
lingering political and governance crisis accompanied by a severe degradation of the
economy, of security and of livelihoods. The country has been trapped in an accelerating
downward spiral that will be difficult to halt and reverse. The origins of the crisis go back to
the troubled past of Haiti. A chronology of key events in the history of Haiti is provided in
Table 1 below:
Table 1: KEY EVENTS IN HAITIAN HISTORY
1 January 1804 Haiti gains independence from France
1807-1820 Civil war between north and south Haiti
1821-1844 Haiti invades and occupies Santo Domingo (Dominican Republic from 1844)
1915-1934 The United States invades and occupies Haiti
1957 Dr. François ‘Papa Doc’ Duvalier is elected President through military-controlled
elections
1959 Duvalier creates his private militia (Tontons Macoutes), following an attempted
coup
1964 Duvalier proclaims himself President-for-Life
1971 Papa Doc Duvalier dies in office after naming his 19 year-old son Jean-Claude
(‘Baby Doc’) as his successor
7 February 1986 Jean-Claude Duvalier leaves Haiti following popular unrest and external pressure
1986-1990 Succession of military coups
16 December 1990 Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide is elected President with 67.5 percent of the votes in
Haiti’s first-ever democratic election
30 September 1991 Military coup by General Raoul Cedras. Aristide goes into exile. An international
embargo is imposed against Haiti in October 1991
19 September 1994 A United States-led military intervention leads to the return of President Aristide in
October
3
CEP stands for Conseil électoral provisoire.
28 April 1995 Aristide abolishes the National Army
1996-2000 As Aristide is not eligible for a second consecutive term, René Préval, a close
associate, is elected President
29 November 2000 Aristide is elected President in an election marked by fraud and extremely low
participation. Economic sanctions are imposed on Haiti
29 February 2004 Aristide is forced to resign and to go into exile. The Security Council authorizes
the deployment of a Multinational Interim Force to be followed by a United
Nations Mission (MINUSTAH)
17 March 2004 A Government of Transition is formed under Prime Minister Gerard Latortue
16 February 2006 René Préval is declared President-elect following elections held on 7 February.
Haiti’s crisis has affected the livelihood of most Haitians and has taken a heavy toll on
their human security. There are several underlying causes and phenomena behind the crisis,
and the four major ones are detailed below.
1.1 A culture of violence
The Duvaliers ruled Haiti for nearly 30 years, and their rule was marked by a widespread
culture of violence. The infamous Tontons Macoutes, Duvalier’s private militia4
, established
a regime of terror beyond the imagination of most people: they had a free hand in arresting,
detaining, torturing and killing whoever was considered to be an opponent of the regime, or
whose wealth members of the ruling class coveted. Thousands were killed or had to flee the
country for their lives. Violence became a means of achieving and preserving absolute
political power.
Outbursts of violence and a round of bloody military coups followed the departure of
Jean-Claude Duvalier in February 1986 and lasted until the elections that brought JeanBertrand Aristide to power in December 1990. Aristide, a former priest, carried the hopes of
the poor masses of Haiti. But in less than a year, a military coup led by General Cedras chased
Aristide into exile. This coup was one of the bloodiest in the troubled history of Haiti: some
1,500 people died, 40,000 fled the country and 200,000 to 300,000 left the capital for the safer
countryside.
The international community imposed an embargo and violent demonstrations rocked
the country. International pressure and a United States-led military intervention finally
brought Aristide back to Haiti on 15 October 1994, to complete his term as President.
Although not eligible for a second term in office according to the Constitution, Aristide
continued to pull many strings when he was replaced as President by René Préval, a close
associate. In 2000, in a Presidential election marked by massive fraud and a participation of
only 10 percent of the registered voters, Aristide was declared the winner with 91.6 percent of
the votes and returned as President.
Although the Duvaliers had gone, ‘Duvalierism’ lived on during the Aristide years.
Violence, human rights abuses and corruption continued unabated and remained a means of
preserving power and accessing wealth. Duvalier’s Tontons Macoutes were replaced by other
armed groups, some of which continue to threaten security to this day. Violence coupled with
impunity has characterized the Haitian political scene for most of the past 50 years.
4
The Tontons Macoutes, literally the bogeymen in Créole, were created by François Duvalier in 1959, following
an attempted coup. In 1971, his son officially re-named the para-military group as Milice Volontaire de la
Sécurité Nationale.
1.2 The loss of moral and civic values
Under the Duvaliers, corruption and the accompanying impunity became the rule for whoever
had any power. The three decades of dictatorship devastated the economy, destroyed tourism,
drove out foreign investors and ruined rural production. The situation was so bad that an
analyst5
claimed that for the Duvaliers and their clients, Haiti’s only real remaining economic
asset was its poverty. Foreign aid agencies and religious and humanitarian organizations
would give millions for development and relief, but most of the funds would be appropriated
by the ruling class, and little would filter down to the people for whom the money was
intended. Corruption, bad governance and impunity remained a foundation of politics during
the Aristide years. This loss of moral and civic values is still affecting Haiti.
1.3 The criminalization of armed gangs
Fearing yet another military coup, President Aristide disbanded the National Army in 19956
.
As the army had been responsible for police activities and for the prisons, these services had
to be built up again. This left a weak police force to look after all aspects of state security and
public order. Discontent among the former military and delays by the Government in
honouring its promises of financial compensation resulted in some members of the disbanded
armed forces forming illegal armed groups or joining existing ones.
Many of the armed groups operating today were created by President Aristide or his
Fanmi Lavallas party as a substitute for an army they did not trust and that they had abolished.
These armed groups became the unofficial armed wing of the regime and a means of
intimidating opponents. In recent years, many of theses armed groups turned to purely
criminal activities.
1.4 An erratic international response
Contrary to a situation such as the one in Afghanistan, Haiti had no clear ‘year zero’, with the
opportunity to reconstruct a State from scratch following a change of regime. Major national
institutions have continued to function during years of political turmoil, in spite of their
difficulties and weaknesses. This, coupled with the absence of geo-political interest in Haiti,
partly explains the tendency of the international community to withdraw prematurely under
the assumption that an election or the return to legitimacy meant that the country could stand
on its own.
In a period of 10 years (1994-2004), two multinational forces had to be despatched to
Haiti. Between 1993 and 2001, no less than six different United Nations Missions were
deployed to the country, each generally considered a failure. Each time, there seemed to be an
urge to exit rapidly, to the extent that there was often pressure from key governments to ‘spin’
the results of United Nations Missions positively for domestic consumption or to justify an
early withdrawal of military or police contingents. It was only from 2004 on that the
international community recognized the need for a long-term commitment in order to secure
the future of Haiti.
5
Abbott, Elizabeth, Haiti: the Duvaliers and their Legacy, , McGraw-Hill Books, New York, 1988 6
President Aristide made this surprise announcement on 28 April 1995, on the occasion of a joint press
conference with visiting Costa Rican President Oscar Arias.
Following the military coup of 1991 and the fraudulent elections of 2000, the
international community reacted by imposing an embargo or sanctions against Haiti. The
intention was to disavow the violent coup and the democratic farce of the elections, but the
effects were devastating, mainly for ordinary citizens. The 1991 embargo had particularly
disastrous results: shortages of petrol, cuts in the supply of electricity, a sharp increase in
consumer prices and the loss of at least 120,000 jobs. In Haiti as in many other situations, the
political and military leaders whose actions justified the sanctions generally went unscathed
and the poorest were disproportionately harmed. The result was more poverty and the
exacerbation of social tensions.
2. Evolution of human security: 2000-2005
Haiti is by far the poorest country in the western hemisphere. In the 2005 global human
development report, Haiti ranks 153rd out of 177 countries in terms of its human development
index (HDI). Guatemala, the nearest western hemisphere country, ranks 117th. Although the
actions of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) and the
Government of Transition have brought about some positive changes, much remains to be
done to improve the condition of the poor.
2.1 Physical security
While a chaotic situation prevailed during most of Aristide’s second Presidency, the situation
was particularly bad from 2003 and up to the resignation and departure of the President.
Uncontrolled armed groups such as the ‘Armée Cannibale’, operating mainly in Gonaïves, or
former members of the disbanded army and the President’s informal militia – the ‘Chimères’
– had a free hand in many parts of the country, perpetuating the cycle of violence and
impunity. In 2004, the deployment of the Multinational Interim Force and later on
MINUSTAH led to the gradual improvement of security conditions.
There is now a sharp contrast between the situation in the provinces and that in
the capital. The larger towns outside Port-au-Prince and the rural areas are now
relatively calm. Armed groups no longer operate in the open. Insecurity, however, has
taken other forms and often concerns human rights abuses, denial of justice or
summary mob executions. In Port-au-Prince, the period leading to the 2006 elections
saw a sharp increase in insecurity, mainly due to the activities of illegal armed groups
operating from neighbourhoods such as Cité Soleil where neither the national police
nor the MINUSTAH forces dare operate. Violence and insecurity in Port-au-Prince are
now characterized by:
ƒ A shift from politically-motivated violence to purely criminal activities,
including kidnappings, drug trafficking, rapes and murders. The criminal
activities of illegal armed groups target all categories of citizens, irrespective
of their social position or political inclination.
ƒ The development of linkages and collusion between illegal armed gangs,
international drug smugglers7
, purely criminal groups or individuals and some
members of the national police and the political and business elite.
ƒ The attempt by illegal armed gangs operating in Port-au-Prince to expand the
territory under their control by moving to new neighbourhoods or pushing their
existing territorial boundaries. For example, gangs operating out of Cité Soleil
had reached areas just next to the international airport at the beginning of 2006.
ƒ The acquisition of more sophisticated weaponry smuggled into the country and
paid for by the proceeds of the illegal activities of armed gangs. In parallel,
many in the middle and upper classes have acquired weapons as a means of
self-protection and the wealthier have often constituted quasi-militia protection
groups.
7
It is estimated that between 18-20 percent of illegal drugs entering the United States transit through Haiti.
As mentioned earlier, the election of René Préval as President in February 2006
coincided with a significant reduction in the number of kidnappings in Port-au-Prince. The
coming months probably present a unique window of opportunity to capitalize on the hopes
for change created among the poorest segments of the population as a result of the victory of
their candidate. If this opportunity is missed, Port-au-Prince and Haiti as a whole could easily
fall back into even worse violence.
2.2 Respect for human rights
Systematic abuses of human rights marked the last years of the Aristide regime. Summary
executions, arbitrary arrests and detention, mob justice, police violence against peaceful
demonstrations, intimidation and violence against journalists and students appeared to receive
a tacit blessing from the authorities. The situation improved from 2004 with the establishment
of the Government of Transition. The relevant section of Annex I details human rights
violations between 2000 and 2005.
The United Nations Independent Expert on the Situation of Human Rights in Haiti
noted in his report of January 2005 that although serious violations persisted (attacks, armed
assaults, reprisals, rapes, murders, summary execution, looting, destruction through fire, etc),
he had observed that, apart from the numerous cases of prolonged detention and reprehensible
police practices, these violations no longer emanated from the Government as such8
. In other
words, violations of human rights are no longer an instrument of power for the Government of
Transition9
. It is hoped that the new Government formed via the 2006 elections will maintain
the same attitude. The major violators of human rights are now the illegal armed groups and
some elements of the national police. The media is considered largely free, although there is
still a certain degree of self-censorship among journalists.
The Government of Transition did not create an independent commission on human
rights or an equivalent institution. There is an Ombudsman function but it is considered weak
and deals mainly with administrative complaints from within the civil service. A number of
human rights groups are active in Port-au-Prince and, at times, intervene even in difficult
neighbourhoods such as Cité Soleil. A more determined national effort and strong support
from the international community will be required in the post-electoral phase to strengthen the
human rights culture and related national institutions.
2.3 The rule of law
Years of abusive use of positions of authority by law enforcement agents, judiciary personnel
and civil servants have made it difficult for Haitians to trust their police, their judicial system
and the state apparatus in general. After 10 years of international support, the national police
force is still considered to be under construction with help from MINUSTAH. The number of
officers – now almost 6,000 – is still short of the ideal 8,000-9,000 for a country with a
population of some 8.3 million. The police force suffers from a negative perception among
the population in Port-au-Prince and the Director General of the Haitian National Police
8
Report by Louis Joinet, Independent Expert on the Situation of Human rights in Haiti, 24 January 2005, United
Nations document E/CN.4/2005/123.
9
It should be noted that the agreement on the transition stipulated that the Prime Minister and the Ministers had
to renounce the possibility of standing in future national elections. The Government of Transition therefore was
more of a technocratic than a political government.
himself is quoted as saying that some 25 percent of his force is corrupt10. Nevertheless, an
opinion survey conducted in preparation for UNDP’s 2005 national human development
report indicates that close to 64 percent of Haitians – mainly those living outside the capital –
trust the police. This could indicate that the joint efforts of the Haitian National Police and
MINUSTAH to make the police force more professional are having some impact.
The same UNDP survey showed that 52 percent of the persons interviewed now
trusted the justice system. In 1999, however, a team of national and international experts
produced a document called ‘Justice in Haiti’ that described the state of the justice system. It
concluded that the justice system was controlled by the political powers and lacked
independence, that it suffered from a chronic lack of financial and human resources, that
judicial personnel was often incompetent and corrupt and that working conditions, including
salaries, were totally inadequate. The report also noted that legislation was totally outdated
and did not correspond to the Constitution or to the international standards and Conventions
that Haiti has formally signed. Contrary to the practice in most countries, the Minister of
Justice also supervises the national police.
2.4 Deterioration of the environment
Over the past decade, Haiti has been hit by no less than 20 internationally recognized natural
disasters11. In 2004, the southern part of the country as well as the Gonaïves and Port-de-Paix
were devastated by major floods resulting in the death of more than 4,000 people while up to
330,000 had their homes totally or partially destroyed. Because of its geography, Haiti is
prone to natural hazards such as hurricanes and tropical storms, earthquakes, floods and
landslides. The increased frequency and intensity of natural disasters is believed to be linked
to severe environmental degradation. Chronic poverty, a high population density12 and a weak
institutional capacity to address long-term issues such as environment have contributed to
anarchic urbanization, deforestation and over-exploitation of agricultural land.
The vulnerability of Haiti to natural disasters has been exacerbated by the recurring
political, institutional and security crises that have weakened the capacity of the State to
develop preventive measures and a national capacity to mitigate disasters. It is now estimated
that 90 percent of the population live in areas that could be affected by hurricanes and tropical
storms and that 37 percent live on land prone to landslides. In Port-au-Prince itself, whole
neighbourhoods, including the 300,000 people living in Cité Soleil, are threatened by floods.
2.5 A slow improvement of the economic environment
From 2000 to 2003, Haiti witnessed near zero annual growth of its gross domestic product.
With the turmoil that marked 2003 and the beginning of 2004, the economy suffered a
negative growth rate of -3.4 percent while the annual growth rate of the population was some
2 percent. There now seems to have been a slight improvement, with a growth rate of 1.8
percent recorded for 2004-2005 and 2.7 percent predicted for 2005-2006. The rate of inflation
also dropped, decreasing from 43 percent in 2003-2004 to 25 percent the following year and
there is a provisional estimate of 15 percent for 2005-2006. As in all similar situations, high
inflation rates penalize mainly the poorest segments of the population.
10 ‘Haiti’s Elections: The Case for a Short Delay’, International Crisis Group, Latin America/Caribbean Briefing
N°9, 25 November 2005.
11 See Annex I for an overview of past natural disasters.
12 The population density is nearly 300 inhabitants per km square
2.6 Persistence of extreme poverty
The economic security of households has deteriorated over recent years. A 2003 survey13 of
perceptions of poverty indicated that 78 percent of heads of households considered
themselves to be poor. In 2001, the percentage of Haitians living in extreme poverty (less than
US $1 a day) and the percentage living on less than US $2 a day stood at 56 percent and 76
percent respectively14. There are significant geographical inequalities with regard to the
prevalence of poverty: in the capital city, only 20 percent of the population lives under
conditions of extreme poverty, while the percentage jumps to 50 percent in other urban
centres and to 59 percent in rural areas.
Table 2 below shows the evolution of selected indicators of human development and
security between 2001 and 2005 and compares the performance of Haiti to the average for
Latin American and Caribbean countries.
2.7 Exodus and brain drain
According to the Ministry for Haitians Living Abroad, there were nearly one in five Hatians –
a total of two million – living outside the country. The number includes 1.2 million in the
United States and Canada, 150,000 in Europe, 350,000 in the Dominican Republic and
another 300,000 in other Caribbean countries. Many fled as refugees, mainly during the
Duvalier years, while others simply sought better opportunities for themselves and their
children away from their country’s difficult security, social and economic situation. The
phenomenon of family reunions also added to the number of Haitians leaving the country.
During the second half of 2005 and the whole period leading to the February 2006 elections
when insecurity and kidnappings were at a height, many among the wealthier families of Portau-Prince either left the country altogether or sent their families away. As in most similar
situations, those who left were often the better educated, the entrepreneurs and those whose
13 ‘Survey on Perceptions of Poverty in Haiti’, carried out in July-August 2003, quoted in the Haitian national
human development report, 2005, UNDP.
14 ‘Survey on Conditions of Life in Haiti’, Haitian Institute of Statistics and Information Technology, 2001
15UNDP, human development reports, 2001-2005. The data in each annual report is generally a few years older
than the year of publication.
Table 2: Evolution of selected human development indicators in Haiti: 2001-200515
Indicator 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Average Latin
America and
Caribbean -2005
Human development index
(HDI)
0.468 0.471 0.467 0.463 0.475 0.797
HDI ranking 134 146 150 153 153 --
Life expectancy at birth 52.4 52.6 49.1 49.4 51.6 71.9
Infant mortality (per 1000) 83 81 91 79 76 27
Undernourished population (%) 62 56 50 49 47 10
Adult literacy rate (%) 48.8 49.8 50.8 51.9 51.9 89.6
wealth or talents would have been needed by their country. It has been estimated, for
example, that 80 percent of the college-educated Haitians now live outside the country.
This Haitian Diaspora has a significant economic impact on the country through
remittances and tourism. It is estimated, for example, that remittances from the United States
alone amount to some 30 percent of Haiti’s gross domestic product16. Most of these
remittances, however, are used for household consumption needs and are not tapped for
investment. Altogether, transfers from abroad directly to families amount to US $800 million,
double the budget of the State.
A different form of brain drain has been the rather intense poaching of Haitian talents
by organizations and agencies of the international community, including the United Nations.
The issue of the difference in salary scales between national institutions and foreign agencies
is a well-known world-wide phenomenon that has never been addressed effectively.
2.8 Representation and access to decision-making structures
A UNDP-sponsored survey quoted in the 2005 Haitian national human development report
indicates that Haitians have little trust in the public institutions that should be representing
their interests. Only 19 percent trust political parties and barely 31 percent the Parliament.
Churches, private health and schooling institutions and even non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) gather much higher marks.
There are hundreds of civil society organizations in Haiti. They are generally
considered to be highly politicized, and their mobilization at the end of 2003 and the
beginning of 2004 played a central role in the ousting of President Aristide. The political
landscape of Haiti was transformed in December 2002 with the creation of the Group of 184
(G-184). The group draws its name from the initial number of member organizations but the
membership in 2004 was thought to be much larger. The G-184 is a loose coalition of civil
society organizations including human rights groups, women’s groups, students, unions,
business associations, rural organizations and neighbourhood committees. Critics of the G184 say that it now represents little more than the opinions of its leaders in Port-au-Prince and
generally reflects the interests of the business elite of Port-au-Prince.
16 ‘International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2006’, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, United States State Department.
3. The role of the international community and of the United
Nations
In an article in the Wall Street Journal, just days after the resignation of President Aristide,
Secretary-General Kofi Annan drew lessons from past interventions of the international
community in Haiti and pledged a long-term commitment to the people of Haiti:
“…the most important lesson is that there can be no quick exit. Haiti will need
our resources and our support for a long time. The present crisis is at least as
much the result of irresponsible behaviour by the Haitian political class as of
omissions or failures in previous international efforts. This means that true
success will involve helping new and more responsible political groups to
emerge – building on the role played in the crisis by the civil society.
That cannot be done quickly. A long-term effort – ten years or more – is needed
to help rebuild the police and judiciary, as well as basic social services such as
health care and education… Getting it right this time means doing things
differently. Above all, it means keeping international attention and resources
engaged for the long haul.”17
It is true that until 2004, the international community’s engagement in Haiti was often
short-lived and shied away from the long-term commitment that would have been the only
possible response to the lingering crisis in Haiti. Between 2000 and 2004, several
international actors shifted their attention away from Haiti as a result of donor fatigue or
frustration at the protracted political crisis. The Organization of American States (OAS) is a
notable exception as it remained as actively engaged in Haiti during 2000-2004 as it had been
over the last 15 years. The OAS has been involved in election monitoring18 and in political
mediation. It has also kept a watch on the human rights situation in Haiti through the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.
The numerous United Nations Missions that preceded MINUSTAH were rather
limited in scope, addressing essentially the creation of a police force. They also suffered from
the well-known weakness of such missions, their limited time horizons. In contrast, the
mandate given to MINUSTAH in 2004 was much broader. When the Security Council created
MINUSTAH in April 2004, it insisted on the need for a long-term commitment. When
approving a further six-month extension of the Mission’s mandate in February 2006, the
Council reiterated its “…intention to renew (the mandate) for further periods…”19. Table 3
below provides a list of United Nations Missions to Haiti since 1993 and illustrates the
differences in mandates between MINUSTAH and the preceding missions.
17 Wall Street Journal, 16 March 2004, Haiti : This time we must get it right, by Kofi Annan. 18 The OAS and other international observer groups withdrew after the first round of the 2000 elections because
of serious irregularities in the electoral process.
19 Security Council Resolution S/RES/1658(2006) of 14 February 2006.
The international community’s support to the transition in Haiti over the last two years
has centred on three major priorities: re-establishing security and containing illegal armed
groups operating in Port-au-Prince, building up a police force, and supporting the electoral
process. Other sectors of intervention have received less sustained attention. Justice, human
rights and the strengthening of State institutions will need to be addressed more forcefully in
the post-electoral period.
No comments:
Post a Comment